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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Joshua Robert Burns appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion to 
suppress and asserts that the district court erred where the totality of the circumstances 
known to the officer at the time he searched the luggage he had previously removed 
from the vehicle was insufficient to justify a community caretaking exception to the 
warrant requirement.  The evidence was thus obtained in violation of his right to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures, protected by the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article I § 17 of the Idaho Constitution.  Mr. Burns 
asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence 
of twelve years, with three years fixed after his conditional plea of guilty to one count of 
felony DUI and one count of trafficking in methamphetamine.   
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
At approximately 1:30 in the afternoon on April 4, 2014, Officer Craig Durrell 
responded to a report that a vehicle was parked in a private driveway with the engine 
running.  (12/11/14 Tr., p.11, L.20 – p.12, L.24.)  Officer Durrell approached the sweaty 
driver who was slumped over the steering wheel and appeared to be unconscious.  
(12/11/14 Tr., p.13, Ls.6-14.)  Officer Durrell got the man to unlock the door and, while 
waiting for the paramedics to respond, the officer obtained the man’s identification and 
confirmed that the driver was Joshua Burns.  (12/11/14 Tr., p.13, L.15 – p.14, L.25.)  
Officer Durrell asked Mr. Burns about alcohol or drug use as he went in and out of 
consciousness, but most of the questions were unanswered.  (12/11/14 Tr., p.14, L.5 – 
p.15, L.16.)  Mr. Burns did say he was taking Seroquel and told the officer he was not 
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overdosing on medications.  (12/11/14 Tr., p.15, Ls.7-14.)  Officer Durrell removed a 
black piece of luggage from the passenger side floorboard and a large toiletry bag from 
the back seat and then did a scan of the rest of the car to make sure there were not any 
weapons that Mr. Burns might be able to access.1  (12/11/14 Tr., p.15, L.23 – p.16, 
L.17.)  Officer Durrell placed these two items of luggage on the trunk of Mr. Burns’ car.2  
(12/11/14 Tr., p.22, Ls.9-20, p.36, Ls.7-12.)  Officer Durrell testified that while Mr. Burns 
was seated in the driver’s side of the car, he was not moving much but would wake up 
and speak to the officer briefly before passing back out, slumped over in the car.  
(12/11/14 Tr., p.21, L.20 – p.22, L.1.)  He did not make any furtive movements or say or 
do anything that led Officer Durrell to believe he was a threat.  (12/11/14 Tr., p.22, Ls.2-
8.)  Five to ten minutes after Officer Durrell moved the luggage, the paramedics arrived.  
(12/11/14 Tr., p.22, Ls.21-25.)   
Once the paramedics arrived, law enforcement backed away from the car and let 
the paramedics take over.  (12/11/14 Tr., p.23, Ls.1-4.)  Officer Durrell watched the 
paramedics evaluate Mr. Burns from a distance, but he could not hear any 
conversations between the paramedics and Mr. Burns.  (12/11/14 Tr., p.23, Ls.7-12.)  At 
one point, the first responders “started searching for any medications or prescriptions 
that he might have had with him that he could have overdosed on.”  (12/11/14 Tr., p.16, 
                                            
1 Defense counsel pointed out on cross examination that the officer removed a bag from 
the passenger floor and a bag from the backseat of the car, but failed to search 
Mr. Burns’ person for weapons.  (12/11/14 Tr., p.20, L.21 - p.21, L.19.)  The officer 
admitted this was an error on his part.  (12/11/14 Tr., p.20, L.21 – p.21, L.3.) 
2 Despite this testimony, State’s Exhibit 3 at the suppression hearing is a photograph of 
three items—a toiletry bag and two small locking hard cases.  (State’s Exhibit 3.) 
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L.18 – p.17, L.2.)  Although he was initially not involved in the discussion about the 
possibility of overdose between the paramedics and the fire personnel on scene, Officer 
Durrell ended up going straight to the luggage and searching it while a paramedic or fire 
EMT watched.  (12/11/14 Tr., p.23, L.14 – p.24, L.20.) 
When Officer Durrell search the luggage he had initially gathered from the 
vehicle, he found several prescription bottles as well as methamphetamine, cocaine, 
and assorted drug paraphernalia.  (12/11/14 Tr., p.17, L.21 – p.19, L.4.)  Mr. Burns was 
transported to the hospital.  (12/11/14 Tr., p.30, Ls.12-20.)  While there, law 
enforcement obtained Mr. Burns’ consent to draw his blood.  (12/11/14 Tr., p.28, L.1 – 
p.29, L.11, p.33, Ls.3-8.)  Analysis of Mr. Burns’ blood revealed positive results for 
methamphetamine and a metabolite of cocaine.  (State’s Exhibit 2, p.15; R., p.59.)  The 
controlled substances taken from Mr. Burns’ luggage consisted of an ounce of 
methamphetamine and an unspecified quantity of cocaine.  (12/11/14 Tr., p.39, Ls.9-14; 
R., p.59.)  Mr. Burns had two prior DUI convictions within the last ten years.  
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI)3, pp.3-4.)  Mr. Burns was charged 
by Information with felony DUI, trafficking in methamphetamine, possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia, and 
driving without privileges.  (R., pp.58-60.) 
Mr. Burns filed a motion to dismiss and/or a motion to suppress evidence and a 
memorandum in support.  (R., pp.77-84.)  Mr. Burns sought suppression of all evidence 
obtained as a result of the warrantless search of his vehicle and the results of the blood 
                                            
3 References to the “PSI” shall include the entire electronic file, including all attachments 
such as letters in support and all evaluations. 
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draw at the hospital.  (R., pp.77-78.)  Mr. Burns sought suppression of the controlled 
substances found in his luggage after the warrantless search of his luggage.  (R., pp.80-
84.)  Mr. Burns sought to suppress the evidence obtained as the result of the blood 
draw, asserting that there was no warrant and he was under duress, disoriented, and 
incapable of giving knowing, intelligent, or voluntary consent for the blood draw.  
(R., pp.81-84.)  A hearing was held on Mr. Burns’ motion to suppress.  (12/11/14 Tr.) 
After the hearing, the district court denied Mr. Burns’ motion to suppress finding 
that the search for medications in the two bags that were located within the wingspan of 
the defendant were part of the community caretaking function, and the intrusion was 
lawful to retrieve medications for the paramedics in order to find a cause for Mr. Burns’ 
medical distress.  (12/11/14 Tr., p.63, L.1 – p.64, L.8.)  The district court also found that 
Mr. Burns gave knowing, intelligent, and voluntary consent to the blood draw.  (12/11/14 
Tr., p.63, Ls.1-6.) 
Mr. Burns entered a conditional guilty plea to Counts I and II, preserving his right 
to appeal the district court’s decision at the suppression hearing.  (12/11/14 Tr., p.65, 
Ls.17-23, p.75, L.4 – p.76, L.8.)  In exchange for the guilty plea to Counts I and II, the 
State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges.  (12/11/14 Tr., p.65, Ls.17-23.) 
At sentencing, the prosecutor asked the district court to sentence Mr. Burns to 
ten years, with three years fixed, on the DUI, and to fifteen years, with three years fixed, 
on the trafficking charge.  (3/5/15 Tr., p.12, L.21 – p.13, L.10.)  Mr. Burns’ counsel 
asked the district court to sentence Mr. Burns to seven years, with three years fixed, on 
each count, to be served concurrently.  (3/5/15 Tr., p.20, Ls.2-9.)  The district court 
sentenced Mr. Burns to a unified sentence of twelve years, with three years fixed.  
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(3/5/15 Tr., p.22, L.19 – p.23, L.6; R., pp.153-157.)  A Judgment of Conviction was 
entered and Mr. Burns filed a timely notice of appeal.  (R., pp.153-157, 162-167.)   
Mr. Burns filed a Rule 35 motion asking the district court to reconsider the 
sentence it imposed.  (R., pp.168-169.)  The district court issued a written order denying 
Mr. Burns’ I.C.R. 35 motion without a hearing.4  (R., pp.173-176.)  
                                            
4 On appeal, Mr. Burns does not assert that the district court erred in denying his Rule 
35 motion as he did not include new or additional information in support of the motion.  
See State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007) (holding “[a]n appeal from the denial 
of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence 
absent the presentation of new information.”)   
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Burns’ motion to suppress? 
 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence in 












Mr. Burns asserts that Officer Durrell exceeded the community caretaking role 
when he searched three items of luggage the officer had retrieved from Mr. Burns’ 
vehicle.  As such, Mr. Burns’ right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, 
protected by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, was violated.  
Therefore, the district court erred in denying Mr. Burns’ motion to suppress. 
 
B. Relevant Jurisprudence And Standards Of Review 
 
In reviewing an order denying a motion to suppress evidence, Idaho appellate 
Courts apply a bifurcated standard of review:  the Court will accept the trial court's 
findings of fact, unless they are clearly erroneous, but the Court will freely review the 
trial court's application of constitutional principles to the facts found.  State v. Purdum, 
147 Idaho 206, 207 (2009).   
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”  
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; IDAHO CONST. Art. I, § 17.  The United States Supreme Court 
has held that when evidence is obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the 
judicially developed exclusionary rule usually precludes its use in a criminal proceeding 
against the victim of the illegal search and seizure.  Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 
(1987). 
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A unanimous United States Supreme Court has held that warrantless searches 
are per se unreasonable.  Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978).  Therefore, a 
warrantless search is presumed to violate the Fourth Amendment.  The State can only 
overcome this presumption by demonstrating that a warrantless search either fell within 
a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable 
under the circumstances.  Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-455 (1971); 
State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 290 (1995); see also State v. Holton, 132 Idaho 501, 
503-04 (1999) (holding the same standard applies to Art. I, § 17 of the Idaho 
Constitution).   
The community caretaking function which arises from the duty of police officers 
to help citizens in need of assistance.  State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 844 (2004).  In 
order to justify the detention of a citizen under the community caretaking exception, the 
officer must have a genuine and warranted concern rather than simply the officer’s 
curiosity, an unsubstantiated suspicion of criminal activity, or an unwarranted concern 
that help might be needed.  Page, 140 Idaho at 844; State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 
824 (Ct. App. 2002). 
In Maddox, the Idaho Court of Appeals explained: 
In analyzing claims that community caretaking justified a detention, Idaho 
courts apply a totality of the circumstances test. “[T]he constitutional 
standard is whether the intrusive action of the police was reasonable in 
view of all the surrounding circumstances.” The reasonableness of an 
officer's action in pursuit of community caretaking is to be “[t]ested upon 
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable persons 
act....” There must be a sufficient public interest furthered by the detention 
to outweigh the degree and nature of the intrusion upon the privacy of the 
detained citizen.  
Maddox, 137 Idaho at 824-25 (internal citations omitted).   
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Further, “[t]he reasonableness of an officer’s action in pursuit of community 
caretaking is to be ‘tested upon practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable persons act.’”  Id. at 824 (quoting Matter of Clayton, 113 Idaho 817, 818 
(1988)).  The Maddox Court noted that community caretaking could not be invoked to 
justify the detention of a citizen that is prompted merely by an officer's curiosity, a 
subjective but unsubstantiated suspicion of criminal activity, or even an unwarranted 
concern that help might be needed.  Maddox, 137 Idaho at 824-25; see also State v. 
Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 104 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the community caretaking doctrine 
did not validate the detention of occupants of a vehicle that had moved forward a few 
feet, then backward, then forward again in a parking space of a parking lot and then 
jerked to a stop, where the officers did not perceive a medical emergency or other 
exigency but harbored subjective suspicions that the driver was connected with recent 
burglaries); State v. Wixom, 130 Idaho 752, 754 (1997) (holding that the community 
caretaking doctrine did not validate the stop of a motorist passing by an accident scene 
long after the accident so the officer could inquire whether the occupants had any 
information about the accident); State v. Osborne, 121 Idaho 520, 526 (Ct. App. 1991) 
(holding that the community caretaking doctrine did not validate the detention of an 
individual standing by a parked vehicle at 2:15 a.m. approximately 300 feet away from a 
lumber yard where, earlier in the evening, police had received a report of someone 
shooting out lights); State v. Schmidt, 137 Idaho 301 (2002) (holding that the community 
caretaking doctrine did not validate the detention of individuals sitting in a car lawfully 
parked on an unimproved pullout after dark in the winter based on the officers' 
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subjective belief, unsupported by any evidence, that the vehicle might have run off the 
road). 
 
C. The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Burns’ Motion To Suppress Where The 
Search Occurred After The Officer’s Role As Community Caretaker Had Ended  
 
Even if Officer Durrell harbored a subjective belief that Mr. Burns was still in need 
of immediate assistance, his belief was not reasonable in view of all of the surrounding 
circumstances.  See Schmidt, 137 Idaho at 304.  Mr. Burns appeared to be having 
medical problems.  Initially, Officer Durrell’s services were necessary for community 
caretaking.  However, once medical personnel arrived and began their work in 
assessing Mr. Burns, Officer Durrell had stepped back and was no longer involved in 
the scene.  (12/11/14 Tr., p.23, Ls.2-13.)  At that point, Officer Durrell and other law 
enforcement had performed their duties as community caretakers, the paramedics were 
on scene, and there was no indication that further law enforcement assistance was 
needed.  Officer Durrell only became re-involved when, of his own volition, he chose to 
lead the search of the luggage.  (12/11/14 Tr., p.23, L.14 – p.24, L.20.)  Notably, Officer 
Durrell testified that once the paramedics arrived, law enforcement backed off and he 
did not recall being asked to search for prescription drugs, yet he was the only person 
going through the bags.  (12/11/14 Tr., p.23, L.1 – p.24, L.20.)  At that point, community 
caretaking had ceased and there was no further need for Officer Durrell to be present, 
nor was there a reason for him to dig around in Mr. Burns’ luggage.  Thus his re-
insertion into the scene to provide an unsolicited search of Mr. Burns’ luggage was 
unreasonable and unlawful. 
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An objective assessment of the totality of the circumstances with which Officer 
Durrell was confronted at the time of the search did not justify a search of the luggage to 
further a community caretaking purpose.  The district court erred in finding that Officer 
Durrell was still engaging in his community caretaking function when he searched 
Mr. Burns’ luggage.  (12/11/14 Tr., p.60, L.21 – p.61, L.2.)  The district court, in 
evaluating the totality of the circumstances, found that Officer Durrell did not believe he 
was looking for illegal substances, despite the fact that Mr. Burns had told an EMT that 
he had used methamphetamine three days earlier.  (12/11/14 Tr., p.60, Ls.1-20.)  The 
district court held, “[t]he community caretaking function is a function for which is 
excluded from the warrant requirement.  U.S. v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137 (2005), takes 
this outside of the issues of needing a warrant, so it’s not just an exception from the 
warrant. It’s actually excluded from the warrant requirement.  In that you do not need 
probable cause to search the vehicle if it’s to ensure the safety and the welfare for the 
citizenry.”  (12/11/14 Tr., p.58, Ls.16-23.)  However, the district court’s statement of the 
controlling authority was erroneous.  The question is whether the intrusive action of the 
police was reasonable in view of all the surrounding circumstances. The 
reasonableness of an officer's action in pursuit of community caretaking is to be 
“[t]ested upon practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable persons 
act....”  Clayton, 113 at 818.  Thus, there must be a sufficient public interest furthered by 
the detention to outweigh the degree and nature of the intrusion upon the privacy of the 
detained citizen–an officer could not simply search a vehicle without a community 
caretaking justification for the specific search.  Simply because the officer is present at a 
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vehicle for community caretaking reasons does automatically give rise to probable 
cause to search the entire vehicle. 
Officer Durrell’s acts in searching the luggage was not justified by a community 
caretaking function because there was a substantial break in time when, upon the 
arrival of medical first responders, he stepped away from the scene, and, for some 
period of time was not privy to the discussions between the paramedics and EMT 
personnel as to what was causing the medical condition.  (12/11/14 Tr., p.23, Ls.1-21.)  
Thus, his subsequent, unrequested re-insertion into the scene solely to search the 
luggage he had previously pulled from the vehicle on the pretense of helping 
emergency medical personnel determine why Mr. Burns was incoherent was not 
objectively reasonable and was not justified by a community caretaking function. 
 
D. The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Burns’ Motion To Suppress 
For the reasons stated above, Mr. Burns asserts that the search of the luggage 
found in his vehicle was unlawful and, thus, violated his Fourth Amendment and Article I 
§ 17 right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.  Mr. Burns asserts that 
the discovery of the evidence used against him was the product of an unlawful search 
and should have been suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree.”  See Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 478-488 (1963).  Therefore, Mr. Burns asserts that the 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Burns To A 
Unified Sentence Of Twelve Years, With Three Years Fixed, Following His Conviction 
For Trafficking In Methamphetamine And Felony DUI 
 
Mr. Burns asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of twelve 
years, with three years fixed, is excessive.  Where a defendant contends that the 
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will 
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the 
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest.  See 
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).   
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence.’”  State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)).  Mr. Burns does not allege that his 
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.   Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of 
discretion, Mr. Burns must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was 
excessive considering any view of the facts.  Id.  The governing criteria or objectives of 
criminal punishment are:  (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and 
the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution 
for wrongdoing. Id.  
In light of Mr. Burns’ rehabilitative potential, the district court abused its discretion 
in sentencing him excessively.  The district court failed to consider the fact that, with 
programming, Mr. Burns could likely be successful in the community.  Notably, 
Mr. Burns went for 31 years without anything more than a traffic violation, but, later in 
 14 
his life, his mental health issues became too much for him to handle.  (PSI, p.10.)  With 
treatment and support, Mr. Burns could be rehabilitated.  (PSI, p.52.) 
One mitigating fact the district court should have more fully considered was the 
fact that Mr. Burns has a very supportive mother and father.  (PSI, pp.3-5, 13, 30.)  
Mrs. Burns testified at her son’s sentencing hearing that he suffers from bipolar disorder 
and needs treatment for that condition.  (3/5/15 Tr., p.3, L.14 – p.7, L.2.)  She also 
testified that her son is a “generous, goal-oriented, and hardworking and honest young 
man.”  (3/5/15 Tr., p.5, Ls.24-25.)  The fact that Mr. Burns has strong support from 
family members should have received the attention of the district court.  See State v. 
Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594-595 (1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who had the 
support of his family and employer in his rehabilitation efforts). 
Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme Court has “recognized that the first offender 
should be accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal.”  State v. 
Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 673 (Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 
(1953), overruled on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227 (1971)); see 
also State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982).  Prior to these charges, Mr. Burns had 
never been convicted of a felony crime.  (PSI, pp.5-6, 10.)  Mr. Burns had lived a law-
abiding life until 2012, when he got divorced and began drinking alcohol.  (PSI, p.48.)  
After a suicide attempt, he was placed on medications for his mental health conditions.  
(PSI, p.48.) 
Mr. Burns suffers from several mental health conditions—bipolar, depression, 
and anxiety.  (PSI, pp.9-13, 17, 46-47.)  The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that 
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Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires the trial court to consider a defendant’s mental illness 
as a sentencing factor.  Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999).   
Although Mr. Burns had a substantial period of sobriety, he began abusing drugs 
and alcohol as a means to cope with his unmedicated mental health symptoms.5  (PSI, 
p.30.)  The Idaho Supreme Court has held that substance abuse should be considered 
as a mitigating factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence.  State v. 
Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982).  In Nice, the Idaho Supreme Court reduced a sentence 
based on Nice’s lack of prior record and the fact that “the trial court did not give proper 
consideration of the defendant’s alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing 
defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for treating the problem.”  
Id. at 91.  Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that ingestion of drugs and 
alcohol resulting in impaired capacity to appreciate criminality of conduct, could be a 
mitigating circumstance.  State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 (1981).  Mr. Burns did 
not start using methamphetamine until age 32.  (PSI, p.48.)  Mr. Burns did drink heavily 
after his 2012 divorce, but abstained from alcohol after his second DUI in September 
2013.  (PSI, p.48.)  However, Mr. Burns wants to remain abstinent from controlled 
substances.  (PSI, p.24.) 
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Burns asserts that the district court 
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him.  He asserts that 
had the district court properly considered his family support, his mental health 




For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Burns respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate the district court’s judgment of conviction and reverse the order which denied his 
motion to suppress.  Alternatively, he respectfully requests that this Court reduce his 
sentence or remand this matter for a new sentencing hearing. 
 DATED this 5th day of April, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      SALLY J. COOLEY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
                                                                                                                                            
5 Mr. Burns had stopped taking his bipolar medication as it gave him suicidal thoughts.  
(PSI, p.30.) 
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